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Abstract
Bar code technology is no more the best candidate for identiﬁcation of any object. RFID replaces the bar code technology due to
its efﬁcient detection capability. However, only one RFID tag in an object reveals less detection rate and hence the need to have
more RFID tags in an object. An object tagged with multiple number of tags aligned with proper angle with each other can be
detected easily. We have proposed an authentication scheme which uses these extra resources for enhancing the security during
authentication.
c⃝ 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Department of Computer Science &
Engineering, National Institute Technology Rourkela.
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1. Introduction
An object such as animal, book, etc. need to be identiﬁed uniquely. Bar code technology were used for serving
this purpose. However, there are the limitations in bar code technology which makes it an inefﬁcient candidate. The
limitations are due to manual involvement in reading process, which includes proper alignment of the reader with bar
code attached to the object, movement of the reader from one object to another, etc. Thus, more than one object at a
time cannot be identiﬁed by the reader. On the other hand, RFID technology can identify objects in a very efﬁcient
manner. RFID tags are attached with the object and reader employ an electro magnetic signal to identify an object.
The tags within the vicinity of reader will respond with the id they belong to. Thus, to read multiple number of objects
attached with RFID tag, the reader do not need to move from one object to another and also it does not necessarily
need to be aligned with tags. The RFID reader can read all the tags within the vicinity of its reading range. Thus,
object identiﬁcation becomes much efﬁcient in comparison to bar code technology.
Attachment of multiple number of tags [1] in an object also increases the detection probability. Any one among
multiple number of tags will be normally visible to the RFID reader. This is because they are typically aligned with
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each other in a proper angle. Hence, a signal coming from RFID reader to any side of object is acceptable to at least
one tag in that object [1]. Thus, object detection rate is better [1] in the use of multiple number of tags than single tag.
Since, RFID is a pervasive computing technology, it is easily susceptible to various attacks. For example, an at-
tacker can easily change the price of an item in a shopping mall attached with RFID tag. This is because the attacker
can use a fake reader to access a tag. Therefore, authentication is a major security requirement in RFID communica-
tion. The reader can access information from the tag if and only if it provides valid authentication information. RFID
chip is a very low cost device due to its huge applicability and pervasiveness property. On the other hand, the tradi-
tional cryptographic technique cannot be applied since the computation required by these techniques is not affordable
by RFID tag. Light-weight cryptographic techniques can be used for secure authentication in this case. However,
light-weight cryptographic technique does not provide sufﬁcient security. Hence, the implementation of authentica-
tion scheme in RFID is a very challenging amid the fact that the authentication scheme need to be light-weight and
able to provide sufﬁcient security as well.
We have studied a number of proposals to authenticate RFID tag. Most of the proposals assumes that an object
is attached with single tag. In this paper, we assume that multiple number of tags are attached to an object and they
cannot communicate directly with each other. In each session, a new master id and a new session key is generated for
an object and they are split into m number of shares in a manner similar to [2] and distributed securely to all the tags.
These shares are also kept in the backend server. However, all tags in the same object may not be visible to reader.
We assume that at least t many tags are visible which were visible in the last successful session. Since, all the tags
in an object may not be visible in a successful session, the invisible tags are not updated and hence the shares they
contain become invalid. However, it will be updated in a successful session with valid share when it will be visible
again. To identify the current share, we have included a version number ver with the shares. The ver value for an
object increases by a random number in each successful session. Hence, the highest ver value identiﬁes the most
recent version. Reader generates the original session key and master id of the object using technique similar to [2].
Since the secrets such as master id and session key are kept in distributed fashion, the attacker needs to obtain at least
t number of shares to recover the original master id and secret key. This increases the security.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we have brieﬂy discussed the related schemes
which have been proposed recently. In section 3, we have described our proposed authentication scheme. In section
4, we have analyzed the proposed scheme. We have concluded with the references in section 5. The glossary gives
the meaning of various symbols we have used in this paper.
2. Related works
We have studied a number of authentication schemes [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] in RFID communication. The
researchers have tried to build light-weight and sufﬁciently secure authentication schemes. We are revisiting few of
them.
Wies et al. [3] proposed an authentication scheme based on hash function. According to them, a tag will be locked
after getting its metaID from a secure source, which is the hash of a random key. When a reader will request, it will
send metaID instead of the original id. The reader will check validity of the same by consulting with database through
a secure channel. If the metaID is valid, the tag will be authenticated and hence reader will send corresponding key
to unlock the tag. Thus, reader will be authenticated and get valid id of the tag. This protocol though simple, suffers
from location privacy problem, since metaID does not change and attacker can easily track it. They also suggested
another scheme called Randomized Access Control (RAC), where the tag will generate a random number and then it
will generate a hash value after attaching the same random number with the id. This will then send the hash value
along with that random number. This avoids the tracking attack as each session has new random number. However,
this scheme suffers from impersonation attack. Because, the attacker can collect hashed item along with random
number and may send the same to a legitimate reader. Thus, attacker can be able to get the id. There are many hash
based solutions [4] [5] [6] we found in the literature.
He Lei et al. [7] proposed an authentication scheme where the tag and backend database will keep Ntag and Ndb
respectively. These Ntag and Ndb are used to check the synchronization status between tag and backend database.
These values are incremented by one in each successful session. Each tag shares a pairwise secret x with backend
database. This secret is also updated in each successful session. Reader will request the tag by sending a random
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number R1. The tag will generate R
′
by encrypting Ntag and R1 with the use of x and send along with Ntag to reader.
It will then forward the same along with R1 to backend database. The backend database will check the validity and
thus authenticate the tag. It will generate R
′′
using R1,Ntag and secret x, and then send this R
′′
to reader. Then the
reader will forward the same to tag. The tag will then check the validity and thus authenticate the backend database.
It will then send an OK or NO message to backend database via reader. On getting an OK message, the backend
database will send the id of the tag to reader. This scheme satisﬁes many security criteria. However, if any of the
intermediate x value get compromised, the successive x values for the same tag can be computed. Thus it does not
provides forward security.
Hoque et al. [8] proposed a server-less authentication scheme where they have used both hash and ex-or function.
In their authentication protocol, they do not have any backend server. A certiﬁcate authority (CA) authorizes a reader
for corresponding set of tags. A reader is preloaded with a list Li of tags consist of id and seed value of each tag
authorized to that reader. Each tag is preloaded with the seed value of the authorized reader and a secret key. Note
that the seed value in a tag and seed value for the corresponding tag in the reader are same. In authentication phase,
reader Ri will broadcast request message using a random nonce randi. The tag Tj will then generate the authentic
information and a random rand j and send to reader. The reader will then check the validity and if success, update its
database and send the authentic information to tag. The tag after checking the validity of the reader will update its
database accordingly.
Guo-Rui Li et al. [9] proposed a public key cryptography based authentication scheme. In their scheme, the reader
will choose a random number and send request message to tag with this number. Tag, in response, will encrypt the
id using public key of server and then encrypt this with shared key S, random numbers r1 and r2. The tag then send
this encrypted information along with a veriﬁable information to server through reader. The server will check the
authentication of the tag and on successful authentication, generate and send the authentication information through
reader. The tag will check the authentication of server and update the information in its memory on successful
authentication. According to their claim, they have fulﬁlled the entire security goals they have mentioned. However,
since they have used public key cryptography technique, the computation requirement is signiﬁcantly high.
Dhal et al. [10] proposed an authentication scheme with the assumption that multiple number of tags are attached
to an object and they can communicate directly each other. In each session, a tag is randomly selected called master
tag for an object. The master tag will check the authentication of backend server and reader. The pair-wise secret key
between the object and backend server is split into shares and are kept in all the tags distributively. The master tag
will collect threshold number of shares and generate the original secret key. It will then check the authentication of
reader and backend server using this key. They have utilized the existence of more resources (tags) to increase the
security of pair-wise secret key between object and backend server. However, they have assumed that tags have the
capability of communicating with each other directly. This is not applicable to passive RFID tag, since they cannot
communicate directly with each other.
After studied the various authentication schemes, we found that most of the schemes assume that an object will be
attached with single tag. We have proposed a scheme [10] earlier with the assumption that more than one tag will be
attached to an object and they can communicate with each other. In this paper, we are proposing an authentication
scheme with the assumption that the tags attached to the object cannot communicate with each other and hence this
scheme is applicable to passive tags also.
3. Proposed authentication scheme
We introduce the various components involve during authentication phase in this section. We assume that the
communication between certain components is insecure and attacker may try to impose various attacks. Hence, we
mention various possible attacks. Finally, we brieﬂy describe our proposed authentication scheme.
3.1. Communication model
In our proposed authentication scheme, the communication model consists of three components, namely, object,
reader and backend server.
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1. Object: Any object such as book, animal, etc. attached with multiple number of RFID tags.
2. Backend server: The information related to all objects will be in a central database. Backend server is respon-
sible for managing the database. It also checks the authentication of object and updates the security parameters
in each successful session.
3. Reader: A RFID reader can communicate with a RFID tag and backend server. We assume that the com-
munication between reader and backend server is secure, while the communication between reader and tag is
insecure.
3.2. Attack model
The communication between reader and object is insecure, and hence an adversary may impose various attacks
such as eavesdropping, forward and backward security, man in the middle attack, replay attack, and location tracing.
Our goal is to prevent the said attacks during authentication.
3.3. The protocol
We have proposed an authentication scheme based on models mentioned in previous sections. Figure 1 illustrates
our proposed authentication scheme.
Figure 1: RFID communication involves authentication
3.3.1. Initialization
Before deployment of objects, readers, and backend server, a few parameters are initialized and preloaded. We
illustrate the initialization phase.
i) Suppose total number of objects are n, denoted as G1,G2, ...,Gn. A set of tags are divided into n subsets and
each subset is assigned to an arbitrarily selected object. Unique random numbers are generated for each object
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and given to corresponding objects. For simplicity, we denote that an object G contains a secret N. The session
key N in G is divided into a number of shares N1,N2, ...,Nm and distributed to all the tags of G using any
scheme similar to [2]. Here m is the number of tags in object G. We keep this information in the backend server
corresponding to object G.
ii) Each tag Tji is assigned a pairwise secret S ji with backend server, where Tji is ith tag of objectGj. For simplicity,
we denote that Si is a pairwise secret key between backend server and ith tag of object G.
iii) A different id acts as master id which is assigned to each object. For simplicity, we denote MID as the master
id for object G. The master id MID is divided into a number of shares MID1,MID2, ...,MIDm and distributed
to all the tags of G using any scheme similar to [2]. Here m is the number of tags in object G. We keep this
information in the backend server corresponding to object G.
iv) We assign a version ver to each tag in an object. Therefore, initially, the version value in each tag of an object
are same. We assign this value as an index of the same object in backend server. Therefore, it helps us to ﬁnd
the record for the corresponding object. This also identiﬁes the most recent share of session key and master
id. In each successful session the ver value is increased by a random number and updated to visible tags and
backend server.
v) All the relevant information for each group are kept in backend server and loaded into corresponding object and
hence into the tags. In this way, the objects are deployed.
3.3.2. Authentication phase:
The following is the description of our proposed authentication scheme in step-by-step fashion. We have used a
few symbols as parameters in the description. The purpose of each symbol and their sizes are given in glossary.
Step 1:
Reader generates a random number v.
Broadcasts request message with v.
Step 2:
Visible tag Ti in an object G subtract ver from MIDi, and subtract v from Ni.
Calculates Ki = (MIDi−ver)⊕ (Ni− v)
Send ver, Ki to reader. Here i denotes the ith tag in object G.
Step 3:
Reader collects all responses from tags.
Checks the highest version value.
If number of response having highest version value is at least t ≤ m i.e. the threshold value then continue
otherwise, discard the messages and stop.
Suppose, the number of valid share is l ≥ m
Reader generates K = f (K1,K2, ...,Kl) from all the shares. Here f () is a secret generation function from shares
similar to the function used in [2].
Forwards K with v and highest ver to the backend server.
Step 4:
In this step, backend server does the following.
a) Search for valid MID
Select ﬁrst record in the index ver and calculates for each tag Ti, the value K
′
i = (MIDi−ver)⊕ (Ni− v), where
i varies from 1 to m i.e. the number of tags in each object.
Calculates K
′
= f (K
′
1,K
′
2, ...,K
′
m). Here f () is a secret generation function from shares similar to the function
used in [2].
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Now, checks if K = K
′
. If they are equal then go to step 4.b
Otherwise check the next record in the same index.
Thus, repeat step 4.a and checks the records in the same index until exhaust the records.
If records are exhausted, reject the message and stop.
b) Generates a new unique random number N1, the new session key and MID1, the new master id.
Generates new version ver1 = ver+g. Here g is a random number.
Split N1 and MID1 into m number of shares such as N1i and MID1i are shares for tag Ti of object G.
Calculates the following for each tag Ti of object G
Pi1 = Si⊕MID1i⊕MIDi. Here Si is the pairwise secret key between tag Ti and backend server and MIDi is the
previous master id share.
Pi2 = TIDi⊕MID1i⊕MIDi. Here TIDi is the tag id of tag Ti.
Pi3 = Si⊕N1i⊕Ni. Here Ni is the previous session key share
c) Updates the database for object G as follows.
Assign the new version value ver1 as new index for that record.
For each tag Ti in object G do the following.
MIDi =MID1i and Ni = N1i
d) Sends ver1,Pi1,Pi2,Pi3 to reader.
Step 5:
Reader forwards ver1,Pi1,Pi2,Pi3 to the object.
Step 6:
In this step, each tag Ti in object G do the following.
a) Calculate the new master id MID1i = Pi1⊕MIDi⊕Si.
b) Verify the validity by calculating TIDi = Pi2⊕MID1i⊕MIDi.
If TIDi is equals to its own id, then validity is conﬁrmed and hence continue, otherwise discard the message and
stop.
c) Determines the new session key N1i = Pi3⊕Ni⊕Si.
d) Updates the values as follows.
Ni = N1i, MIDi =MID1i, and ver= ver1.
In this way, a legitimate reader can read the information about a legitimate object.
4. Analysis of the scheme
4.1. Authentication analysis
In the proposed authentication scheme, the communication involves mainly three components, namely, reader,
object, and backend server. We explain how the authentication is ensured for these components.
a) Object: The validity of object is conﬁrmed in step 4, where the backend server checks for a valid record. If any
such record exists for which K is valid, then only the validity will be conﬁrmed. Otherwise the backend server
will simply drop the message. Thus, object is authenticated.
b) Reader: We have assumed that the communication between reader and backend server is secure and hence
reader is authenticated.
886   Subhasish Dhal and Indranil Sengupta /  Procedia Technology  6 ( 2012 )  880 – 888 
c) Backend server: Authentication of backend server is ensured in step 6, where each tag has Si, the pair-wise
secret between backend server, and tag Ti in object G. Validity of new master id share MID1i and new session
key share N1i can be ensured only if the calculated master id share MID1i successfully decrypts the id TIDi.
Again, valid MID1i can be recovered if the encryption is done by backend server with valid Si. Thus, backend
server is authenticated to the object.
4.2. Security analysis
In our proposed scheme, the communication between reader and object is insecure and adversary may try to impose
various kinds of attacks. We describe the possible attacks and how they are prevented by our proposed authentication
scheme.
Eavesdropping: The attacker may try to learn the conversation between reader and object. This is not possible
because all the communications between tag and reader are encrypted with pair-wise secret. Moreover, the Master id
of an object and session key between that object and backend server is split into a number of shares and distributed
to all the tags in the same object in a manner similar to [2]. The shares are also kept into backend server for checking
authentication of object. The secret sharing scheme proposed in [2] is claimed to be applicable with adequate security
in mobile ad hoc networks which also suffers from various resource constraints. Hence, the secret sharing similar to
[2] is also applicable to RFID. The secret can be recovered using a minimum of t out of m number of shares, and no
less [2]. Therefore, if an attacker wants to recover the secret, it needs to collect at least t number of shares. In other
words, a minimum of t tags need to be compromised. Therefore, any adversary is unable to obtain the information
between the object and reader. The communication between reader and backend server is assumed to be secure and
hence according to our assumption, since all the reader connected with the backend server are legitimate, there is no
possibility that any non-legitimate reader will obtain the secure information.
Forward security: In our proposed authentication scheme, if any adversary able to ﬁnd both Ni and N1i as session
keys and both MIDi and MID1i for tag Ti in object G, then it can compromise the future communication for tag Ti,
i.e. to compromise the future communications it needs to compromise successive two random secrets share and two
master id share for at least threshold number of tags. We assume that the adversary is unable to compromise two
successive communications. However, if the adversary fails to do so, the forward security is ensured in our proposed
authentication protocol.
Backward security: Our proposed authentication protocol ensures backward security. If an adversary compromises
any secret information like Ni or MIDi, even then she will be unable to get the past information. This is because in
each communication, the secure information is changing randomly and hence they will not help the adversary to get
the past information.
Man in the middle attack: Suppose the attacker is in between object and reader. She may block the original messages
and send fake messages. However, fake messages will not be veriﬁed since the attacker does not have any secret key
between object and backend server.
Replay attack: An adversary may store the valid information during any authenticated communication and try to use
it in future for compromising the communication. She would request the tag to send master id by declaring herself
as a legitimate reader. Since she does not know the session key share Ni, she will be unable to get the master tag id
share. She may now keep this message and when any legitimate reader will ask for the id, she would send the stored
information by declaring herself as a legitimate tag. However, this message will not be veriﬁed since a nonce v is
involved with the message and the message sent by adversary has old nonce instead of new nonce. Moreover, it is
unable to inject the new nonce since it does not know the secrets MIDi and Ni. Thus, our proposed authentication
protocol prevents the Replay attack.
Location tracing: The attacker may try to track the object. However, master id share MIDi, session key share Ni,
and version of share ver are changing in each successful authentication. Hence the generated Ki is different in each
session. Therefore, the attacker will be unable to track the object. However, between two successive sessions the
object is traceable due to same ver value and Ki.
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4.3. Comparison
During literature survey, we have seen that the previously proposed schemes suffer from various problems. How-
ever, our scheme does not have those problems. The scheme proposed in [3] suffers from impersonation attack and
hence the adversary is able to act as a legitimate entity. In our scheme, the adversary does not have this facility due
the use of random nonce. In [7][8], the schemes suffer from forward security problem. Our scheme provides forward
security since there is no relation between variable secrets used in different sessions. In [9], they have used public
key cryptography for encryption, which is computationally expensive for low cost resources such as RFID tag. We
have used simple XOR operation for encryption which is lightweight and applicable to RFID tag. In comparison to
our previous scheme [10], the scheme we have proposed in this paper is applicable to all sorts of RFID tags whereas
the previous scheme was applicable to active or semi passive RFID tags since the the tags need to communicate with
each other.
5. Conclusion
RFID is most pervasive computing technology and suffers from various attacks. Due to resource limitations in
RFID, any implementation is very challenging. Thus, implementation of authentication is also a very challenging
task. Most of the scheme in the literature have assumed the existence of only one tag in an object. We have assumed
that multiple number of tags are attached to an object and thus have taken the advantage of extra resources (tags).
A secret which distributed to multiple tags is difﬁcult to reconstruct until and unless a minimum number (threshold
value) [2] of shares are collected. This strengthens the security of our proposed scheme. However, if two successive
session keys between a tag and reader is revealed, it may cause the further session key shares to be revealed. Still
the attacker need to compromise successive session key shares for at least t tags to recover further session key. We
have assumed that the attacker is unable to gather such information. Our scheme also suffers from location privacy
problem between two successive session. We are working to improve the deﬁciencies in our proposed scheme.
Glossary of terms
v: Random number generated by the reader during sending the request message to objects
ver: version value of share in tags
MID: Current Master id
MIDi: Current Master id share in a tag Ti
N: Current session key
Ni: Current session key share in a tag Ti
MID1: New Master id
N1: New session key
Si: Pairwise secret key between tag Ti and backend server
TID j: Tag id
MID1i: New Master tag id share for a tag
N1i: New session key share for a tag
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